Financial collapse and infrastructure disintegration of Wildberries: catastrophic damage of 400 billion rubles from drone attacks inevitably leads the company to default
Journalists on the Real Damage to Wildberries from Drone Strikes and the Eroded Trust in the Marketplace.
Over 18 days – from July 18 to August 5 – at least 21 Wildberries logistics facilities came under attack. Some complexes continued operating, others were shut down, and a few sustained critical damage. This is no longer a series of localized fires. We are witnessing the first major stress test of Russian platform-based commerce, where three levels of the system are simultaneously affected: the marketplace’s infrastructure, sellers’ inventory, and the working capital of tens of thousands of entrepreneurs.
Preliminary estimate: the total direct damage could already be in the range of 275–370 billion rubles, though experts are talking about 400 billion rubles.
What Happened
The first confirmed attack of this series occurred on July 18. Wildberries facilities in Elektrostal and Kotovsk were hit. The consequences were severe not only for the business. In Elektrostal, one person was killed and dozens were injured. In Kotovsk, seven employees died and another 25 were injured. Subsequently, fires, destruction, and operational stoppages were recorded at facilities in Krasnodar, Nevinnomyssk, Shushary, Novosaratovka, Penza, Sarapul, Perm, Volgograd, Novosemeykino, and in the Vladimir, Leningrad, and Tver regions.
By August 5, sources counted no fewer than 21 attacked facilities.
The Cost of Physical Infrastructure
Initial calculations used the construction cost of a Class A warehouse at 60,000–70,000 rubles per square meter. Applying this mechanically to 909,000 m² yields 54.5–63.2 billion rubles for the construction alone. After adding conveyors, sorting lines, shelving, automation systems, servers, and firefighting equipment, the restoration cost could indeed exceed 65–75 billion rubles. However, this is an estimate of replacement cost, not a confirmed accounting loss.
First, not all facilities have been completely destroyed.
Second, some buildings may belong to third-party owners or developers.
Third, insurance coverage, residual book value, damage to engineering systems, and the possibility of restoring individual buildings must be taken into account.
The Main Loss Is Not in Concrete
The most valuable asset destroyed in the fires is not the buildings themselves, but sellers’ goods.
Research company Data Insight estimated seller losses as of August 3 at 215–280 billion rubles. The calculation is partly based on the experience of the 2024 fire at the Shushary warehouse: after the destruction of a 112,000 m² complex, Wildberries compensated nearly 35 billion rubles for inventory. This benchmark corresponds to an inventory density of roughly 312,000 rubles per square meter. After the attacks of August 4–5, the final estimate may increase. Therefore, a range of 230–300 billion rubles for inventory losses appears to be a realistic working scenario.
Why 400 Billion Rubles Is Not a Fact but No Longer Fantasy
Adding up:
70–80 billion rubles in damage to real estate and equipment;
230–300 billion rubles in destroyed goods;
costs for rerouting flows, downtime, payments to victims, and restoring IT and logistics systems,
the range of direct and immediate operating losses comes to roughly 275–400 billion rubles. However, the upper bound assumes simultaneously high restoration costs, near-total loss of goods at the hardest-hit facilities, and limited insurance payouts.
And this is still not the total economic damage. The calculation does not include supplier bankruptcies, lost tax revenues, emergency borrowing costs, disrupted production orders, rising insurance premiums, or increased working capital needs across the entire supply chain.
Why Wildberries’ Profit Does Not Answer the Solvency Question
According to unaudited data from the RVB group, its turnover (GMV) in 2025 reached 6.1 trillion rubles, with net profit of 175 billion rubles. Its logistics infrastructure area exceeded 5.2 million m².
Two conclusions follow. First: a significant portion of the network is affected. If the estimate of damaged area at 893,000–1,154,000 m² is correct, that represents about 17–22% of the group’s total claimed logistics space.
Second: comparing the damage to 6.1 trillion rubles in turnover is incorrect. Turnover is the value of goods passing through the platform, a significant portion of which belongs to sellers. This is not revenue, and certainly not free liquidity for Wildberries. Even compensating 60–70% of estimated inventory losses would require 140–210 billion rubles. That is comparable to or exceeds the group’s entire net profit for 2025. Full compensation of 300–400 billion rubles would require using accumulated liquidity, insurance payouts, debt financing, shareholder support, or state mechanisms.
VTB Is Not Wildberries’ Wallet
VTB Group’s IFRS net profit for 2025 was indeed 502.1 billion rubles. In addition, VTB announced the acquisition of a 5% stake in WB Bank. However, it does not follow that VTB is obligated or intends to finance Wildberries’ compensation payments. A stake in the marketplace’s bank is not the same as a stake in the RVB group. VTB’s net profit is also not a free fund: it is tied to capital requirements, dividends, reserves, and shareholder decisions. VTB and Kostin, in particular, will clearly not take on sellers’ losses.
It is also clear why VTB was chosen for this scheme: Suleiman Kerimov was the largest private shareholder of the bank until 2008 – he has effectively grown roots inside the system, and the bank has always participated in all his schemes. Whether it was financing the purchase of Polyus Gold, where Kerimov did not contribute a penny, or the scheme with the Eurasia Tower in Moscow City: Kerimov bought out VTB’s claims against Pavel Fuks (using VTB’s money, by the way), then seized Eurasia at a price of 200,000 rubles per meter, and ultimately sold Eurasia back to VTB at 1 million rubles per meter.
Such Is the Simple Arithmetic
On July 7, 11 days before the first attack, a new version of Wildberries’ offer agreement came into force. It included drone strikes, shelling, and explosions as force majeure circumstances.
Formally, this strengthened the platform’s position in disputes over compensation for lost goods. However, the offer clause does not guarantee automatic exemption from liability for Wildberries. Each dispute may assess causality, the adequacy of security measures, evacuation procedures, fire response actions, insurance coverage, and the compliance of contract terms with the law.
The company subsequently announced voluntary payments. By the end of July, it was reported that more than 40 million rubles had been transferred to sellers. Against the backdrop of estimated losses in the hundreds of billions, this remains a symbolic amount.
After goods are destroyed, the debt remains while cash flow disappears. Thus, even a partial delay in compensation can cause a cash gap, default, and a chain of claims against business owners.
The Hidden Risk Is Not the Size of the Fire but the Velocity of Turnover
Wildberries can rebuild warehouses and raise financing. Much harder to restore is seller trust.
If sellers begin to massively shift supplies to Ozon, Yandex Market, and their own channels, the company will face several simultaneous effects:
reduced assortment;
declining product availability across regions;
worsening delivery times;
lower purchase frequency;
rising unit logistics costs;
additional seller churn.
This is a nonlinear process. Loss of assortment worsens customer experience; lower customer traffic makes the platform less attractive to sellers; and shrinking volume raises the cost of processing each unit.
That is precisely why a loss of 300 billion rubles with stable turnover, and the same loss with a 15–20% drop in turnover, are two fundamentally different scenarios.
Seller Commissions
Sellers indeed report a sharp rise in the total cost of working with Russian marketplaces. For comparison: 47% for a Russian platform versus 3% for Taobao and 15% for Amazon.
The Russian figures may simultaneously include commission, acquiring, logistics, storage, last-mile delivery, advertising, and fines. On foreign platforms, some of these costs are paid separately.
Large sellers on WB and Ozon receive individual discounts, while small companies pay a higher aggregate rate. It is small businesses that are the least protected against inventory destruction and temporary sales halts.
In Conclusion
The Wildberries crisis is not a story about just one marketplace, nor merely the cost of burned warehouses.
Through its infrastructure flow the goods of hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs. For many of them, the loss of inventory does not mean a reduction in profit, but the instantaneous disappearance of all working capital while debts to banks, suppliers, and the state remain.
The confirmed damage estimate is currently below 400 billion rubles. But 400 billion may become a reality if physical losses are compounded by mass seller defaults, assortment outflow, and a sustained decline in turnover.
